tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-25995363.post8033639138993710877..comments2023-06-20T01:49:29.525-07:00Comments on Blogging About the Unthinkable: Civil Defense History: The Importance of ChronologySovietologisthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09099598091505738702noreply@blogger.comBlogger3125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-25995363.post-57599298249159379272008-08-09T11:44:00.000-07:002008-08-09T11:44:00.000-07:00What you say about the FCDA's ignorance may well b...What you say about the FCDA's ignorance may well be true; certainly from a purely Machiavellian perspective, it might be advantageous to have your propagandists actually believe what they are saying. Nevertheless I still believe that those high up in the government were well aware that an exchange was highly unlikely. The fact that no substantive civil defense measures were taken at that time - building shelters being the most obvious - indicates a certain lack of concern that can only be adequately explained by confidence that they would not be needed <BR/><BR/>The strategic mechanics of nuclear war are relatively simple, and we can assume that military planners at the time figured them out quickly. Any attack that did not bring your opponent to his knees immediately would result in a counter attack that would leave both sides weakened. I'm sure that this was particularly apparent to the Soviets who were more vulnerable to a conventional offensive than any Western power at the time.<BR/><BR/>Real deterrence then (as now) is a product of <I>tactical</I> nuclear weapons, that can effectively stop armored columns or amphibious invasions quickly across a broad front, without needing a massive amount of equipment and manpower. Breaking up each others cities simply had no real military value at that time, (or now) and again I cannot believe that this was not understood by those in charge. <BR/><BR/>What they did do is leverage the attack on Japan (which was done to <I>end</I> a war not start it) to cultivate public fear for political gain.<BR/><BR/>Now in all fairness I know that some felt that holding your opponents cities hostage, as it were, permitted more latitude on the ground particularly in regional conflicts, but in general a nuclear capability paradoxically raises the threshold for action (think of the the Hungarian and Czechoslovakian uprisings, which were not aided by the West) so even if some felt it was a necessary tool it was unlikely that this attitude lasted too long. Too at the beginning, a limiting factor was that a city was the smallest target that could be reliably acquired by the long range delivery systems in use, but as accuracy increased, primary targets shifted away from cities and on to purely military installations.<BR/><BR/>The point here being that what was being fed to the public about the risks of nuclear war, and the real conditions on the ground were not in alignment, and the only reason for that had to be domestic manipulation.DV8 2XLhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14595060432772287143noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-25995363.post-47771041907065853212008-08-09T10:18:00.000-07:002008-08-09T10:18:00.000-07:00It is true that some FCDA efforts present nuclear ...It is true that some FCDA efforts present nuclear war as a normative threat. "Operation Cue" simply isn't a good example of these. Films and literature that discuss how a nuclear war will start, such as <I>The Day Called X</I>, do portray Soviet surprise nuclear attack as an ever-present threat that can occur at any time. However, this reflects the actual thinking of the FCDA, not some sort of onerous conspiracy to militarize society. I believe that the FCDA was only manipulating the populace so that they would "wake up" to a threat in which FCDA planners genuinely believed, even if it bore little relation to the actual strategic balance.<BR/><BR/>The question of what defense planners knew about actual Soviet capabilities is fairly complex. As the U-2 entered service in 1954, it was only in the late 1950s that the US discovered the true extent of Soviet strategic weakness. On top of this, only a very limited circle of government officials were privy to this information. Everything I have seen indicates that the FCDA was way outside of the information loop, especially given that continuity of government functions were the responsibility of another agency. Their evaluations of Soviet nuclear attack intended for internal use greatly exaggerate Soviet strategic power.<BR/><BR/>It should also be kept in mind that the paranoia of many Americans regarding Soviet nuclear intentions resulted in a belief that if the Soviet threat didn't exist <I>now</I>, it would exist as soon as the Soviets managed to make it hard fact. This was a pretty common theme in the domestic debate about the non-existent "missile gap" in the late 1950s. This mode of thought seems to have been endemic among SAC generals, and fed into their demands for ever-increasing expenditure on strategic nuclear weapons.<BR/><BR/>The extent to which US government officials (and ordinary Americans) genuinely feared and hated the Soviet Union is hard to relate to in retrospect--especially for someone like me who spends a lot of time in Russia. But as far as I have been able to gather, the people in the FCDA was probably more scared than anyone, however brave a face they tried to put on for the public.Sovietologisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09099598091505738702noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-25995363.post-16196265682359242982008-08-09T09:10:00.000-07:002008-08-09T09:10:00.000-07:00While I agree that the film in question is not as ...While I agree that the film in question is not as strident as Masco seems to think it is, there is some truth in his assertion that a certain amount of propaganda of the time was geared to present nuclear war as a normative threat, long before the arsenals of any potential enemy were capable of an effective nuclear attack. I also don't believe that this fact was unknown to defense planners at the time. <BR/><BR/>For example we know now that talk of 'missile gaps' were in fact designed to promote elevated spending. Having lived through that era I can understand Masco's point of view, despite the poor illustration he is using.<BR/><BR/>Now admittedly the perspective of a child, (as I was at the time) is somewhat different than an adult; weekly duck-and cover drills at school however did seem to indicate to me that that nuclear war was if not inevitable, certainly highly probable. Even the adults, who you must remember were no strangers to total war, took this very seriously. So it is very hard for me, given what we now know about what the real capabilities of the nuclear powers at the time were, not to see that much of this was willfully mendacious propaganda.<BR/><BR/>This is not to excuse poor analysis, and Masco is too young to have experienced the time as I have, but there is an element of broad truth in the accusation that public opinion then was being manipulated to accept the likelihood of nuclear war.DV8 2XLhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14595060432772287143noreply@blogger.com